Preventing knowledge transfer errors: Probabilistic decision support systems through the users’ eyes  by Tabachneck-Schijf, Hermi J.M. & Geenen, Petra L.
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 461–471Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / i jarPreventing knowledge transfer errors: Probabilistic decision support
systems through the users’ eyes
Hermi J.M. Tabachneck-Schijf *, Petra L. Geenen
Department of Information and Computing Sciences, Utrecht University, P.O. Box 80.089, 3508 TB Utrecht, The Netherlandsa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 1 February 2007
Received in revised form 29 October 2007
Accepted 16 April 2008
Available online 17 June 20080888-613X/$ - see front matter  2008 Elsevier Inc
doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2008.04.010
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: hermi@cs.uu.nl (H.J.M. Tabacha b s t r a c t
Development and use of probabilistic decision support systems beneﬁt by good communi-
cation between the developer on the one hand, and the user and the domain expert on the
other hand. Communication is difﬁcult because large differences in training and experi-
ence, and thus also expectations, exist between the two. This causes knowledge transfer
errors. Preventing these necessitates user-centered design of the representations used in
this communication, and attention to the translation of user terms to model terms and vice
versa. A systematic approach to developing user-centered representations and preventing
knowledge transfer errors is outlined in this paper. We demonstrate how ﬁve heuristic
guidelines can be fruitfully applied in different developer–user interaction situations in dif-
ferent phases of decision-support system construction, and brieﬂy outline an evaluation of
a data-entry system developed using these guidelines.
 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Increasingly, developers of decision-support systems (DSSs) that build upon a probabilistic network realize that many end
users do not understand the classical probabilistic network representation, comprised of nodes, arcs and conditional prob-
ability tables. This emerges in, for example, slow and error prone data entry and outcome assessment. Some developers have
attempted to adapt the classical representation to avoid user problems, sometimes ending up with quite different represen-
tations, e.g. [10,7,8]. However, we have not come across a systematic approach to tackling this representation problem. In
addition to problems between user and model, our research group has noticed problems with the transfer of knowledge from
the user and the expert to the developer. As errors in this transfer can have consequences for the structure and content of the
probabilistic network, paying attention to possible error sources can pay off. A systematic approach that addresses preven-
tion of errors in knowledge transfer in both directions increases the probability that the design of the resulting model and
representations are optimal. We believe that the source of the lack of understanding lies in differences in the knowledge pos-
sessed by the developer and the end user, on which we will elaborate in Section 3. Knowledge-transfer problems occur in any
phase of the construction of the probabilistic network in which knowledge transfer between developers and domain experts
or end users is needed, not only in the phase where the end-product reaches the end user.
We have identiﬁed ﬁve knowledge-transfer phases. The ﬁrst two phases concern the manual construction of a probabi-
listic network, and consist of (1) eliciting knowledge so the ﬁrst model can be constructed and (2) checking this model with
the user. For these two phases usually the knowledge of domain experts is elicited. Here, the interactions between the do-
main experts and the developer are needed even if the system is intended for only AI research. Phases 3, 4 and 5 relate to the
design of a DSS interface that is meant for end users who are not mathematicians or computer scientists. In Phase 3, a means. All rights reserved.
neck-Schijf), petrag@cs.uu.nl (P.L. Geenen).
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sults are explained and/or justiﬁed.
In this paper, we introduce a systematic approach on how to prevent knowledge transfer errors from developer or model
to expert or end user and vice versa. The designer, as we will argue, should interact closely with experts and end users by
using speciﬁcally adapted (i.e., user-centered) representations. To this end, we systematically improve the representations,
led by heuristic guidelines, and create awareness for the need for knowledge translations by looking at the probabilistic DSS,
so to speak, ‘through the users’ eyes’. The heuristic guidelines we introduce are based on user-centered design principles tar-
geted to prevent knowledge-transfer errors, distilled from our practical experience and from human–computer interaction
theory. These ﬁve guidelines are: (1) preserving the precision of the probabilistic information, (2) using language and a work-
ﬂow that is compatible with the user’s profession, (3) using the so-called natural language, (4) hiding difﬁcult to understand
technological/mathematical constructs and (5) making the system as user-efﬁcient as possible.
We begin by identifying likely sources of knowledge-transfer errors separately in each knowledge-transfer phase. Next,
we explain these sources in human–computer interaction theoretical terms. In Section 3, we present the ﬁve heuristic guide-
lines outlined above. In Sections 4 and 5, we will elaborate on design Phases 1 and 3 because our representation work to date
has concentrated on these two phases. For each of these phases, we will describe the interaction between the developer and
the expert or the end user and identify knowledge transfer errors that may occur. For each phase, we then show solutions
generated by others and ourselves where possible, and show how and where these solutions ﬁt in with our guidelines. Fi-
nally, we brieﬂy summarize an evaluation of a data-entry module we designed using our guidelines, make concluding obser-
vations and outline possibilities for future work.
2. Theoretical background: phases of knowledge transfer in DSSs
A summary of the phases, with example user-centered representations and suggested knowledge format translations is
found in Fig. 1.
In Phase 1, knowledge needs to be elicited to determine the network’s content and structure. For this, information about
the relevancy of, values of, and interrelations between the stochastic variables is needed, as well as the probabilities to be
assigned to the relations. In general, the knowledge of domain experts is indispensable in this effort. Obtaining accurate
information, however, is far from a trivial problem, as the developer and domain expert literally speak different languages
and structure the knowledge to be obtained quite differently. We will elaborate on this in the following two sections. Once
elicited, the knowledge from the domain expert still has to be translated, i.e., to be put in terms of the model.
In Phase 2, the model has to be evaluated as to its quality and diagnostic value. The model’s reasoning should approxi-
mate that of an expert – well, actually an improved expert without decision or reasoning biases and with the ability to han-
dle very complex computations. Two possible developer–expert interactions are distinguished here, one concerning the
performance and the other the debugging of the model. Checking performance can be done against real cases, but the per-
formance of the experts in such cases cannot be considered a gold standard as it contains the very errors the model tries to
prevent. However interesting, that problem falls outside the scope of this paper. There has, to our knowledge, not been much
research on whether and how to involve the expert in debugging the model. The format of the information, a probabilistic
network and other mathematical formats, has been shown to be very difﬁcult to understand by experts for the debugging
task. Our research group is currently researching representation formats with which the expert can be more fruitfully in-
volved in both performance checking and debugging. One of these efforts is described in the paper Verifying monotonicity
of Bayesian networks with domain experts by Van der Gaag, Tabachneck-Schijf and Geenen (this issue).
Phases 3, 4 and 5 relate to the design of DSS interfaces that are meant for end users who are not mathematicians or com-
puter scientists. Of interest in these phases is, ﬁrst, with whom the developer should interact. Although domain expertsFig. 1. The ﬁve phases with example user-centered representations and knowledge format translations.
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about the domain of probabilistic reasoning in the network than naïve users by the time their interaction with the develop-
ers of the network comes to an end. Because of this knowledge they may not interpret statements about probability in the
same way as naïve end users, e.g. [1] – see also Section 3. Hence, we strongly feel that the actual projected users should be
consulted in these three phases, and not the domain expert or, say, more easily available students in the domain. Note that
we do advise using the end-users’ time wisely, pre-formatting interaction representations ﬁrst, using whatever knowledge
the developer already has in-house.
Phase 3 consists of designing an interface through which end users supply the needed evidence for the model: data entry.
In data entry, the format in which information about values of the variables is elicited is the issue. This representation should
be understood by the user, but yet the information in it must be true to the contents of the probabilistic network. Moreover,
the answers given by the end users are possibly not in the terms of the network, and translation back to network terms may
be needed. Also, the data-entry order should comply with the normal working order of the user. Our solution for the data-
entry is to apply user-centered design to the data-entry module’s interface, with an emphasis on following our ﬁve guidelines.
In user-centered design, an interface is designed in collaboration with the end user and thus speciﬁcally targeted to that type
of end user.
Showing the results of the model’s computations to end users comprises Phase 4 of interaction. Here, the issue is to design
a representation that communicates the results in such a way that they are both mathematically correct and understandable
to the end user. For most DSSs published in the literature, the results are communicated by simply returning the probabil-
ities or providing an ordered list of the most likely outcomes, e.g. [12,16]. Some researchers, however, do a much better job at
making results understandable to the user. The TraumaSCAN-web project combines 3D reasoning about anatomy/geometry
with probabilistic reasoning based on Bayesian networks. They convey likely trauma to a body by color-coding the likelihood
of damage at a particular spot in the 3-D model. This way, the computed results of the model are directly integrated into the
users’ (physicians) mental model of trauma and its consequences, centered on processes in the human body [15].
Lastly, in Phase 5, the model’s computational results will need to be explained and justiﬁed. Making it clear to the end
user how the model came to its conclusions, justifying the conclusions, and clarifying what the limitations of the model
are in this is a challenge that has been recognized by others (reviewed in [9]).
We now discuss the cognitive roots of knowledge transfer errors.3. Theoretical background: causes of knowledge transfer errors
Below, as an example, we will use a physician as a typical end user of a diagnostic DSS. However, the same case could be
made for lawyers, psychologists, veterinarians, most managers, most non-mathematical academicians, etc., in combination
with diagnostic or other types of DSSs. We brieﬂy lay out exemplars of goals and tasks that the physician wants to accom-
plish with a DSS and compare these to those of academic developers of the DSS. We also describe the differences in the
knowledge of the developer and the physician, and explain why this makes such a large difference in interpreting the clas-
sical probabilistic network representation. We argue that a complete redesign of the representations (whether on paper or a
computer) is needed for those phases in which interaction of a developer and a non-mathematical expert or a non-mathe-
matical end user occurs. We further argue that the current representation should be maintained for developers’ tasks.
3.1. Goals, tasks and knowledge bases
Physicians are trained as professionals who apply their medical knowledge to diagnose and treat disease. A knowledge
base (a cognitive science term) consists of what a person learns and what they experience. Physicians’ professional knowl-
edge bases consist of coursework from their academic training, centered on improving the health of a human being: anat-
omy, biochemistry, disease patterns, medications, etc. Hardly any probability theory. In addition, their professional
knowledge base contains practical experience, for instance patient–doctor interactions, diagnoses, treatments, and doc-
tor–doctor consults, much of it in case formats. Their practical experience is very unlikely to entail practice with probabil-
ity-theoretic concepts.
Physicians’ primary goal is to improve patient care. They realize that a DSS may help them to avoid wrong decisions that
can at best delay correct treatment and at worst kill the patient. Tasks they seek help with in a DSS are diagnosis and treat-
ment decisions. They seek something akin to a competent colleague, who offers a second opinion and who can explain in
understandable terms how he came to the opinion. Physicians also want a tool that either saves them time, or, if it takes
time, offers another beneﬁt that they are convinced makes good on the invested time. In addition, it is likely that physicians
will want the DSS to generate explanations, on demand, that help them understand the outcomes of the computations.
The people who develop medical DSSs, on the other hand, are currently generally PhD-level computer scientists. Their
academic training centers on improving the workings of a computer by improving the software. Training involves, among
others, mathematics, logic, computer programming, and algorithm design. No medical knowledge. As scientists, they also
possess much practical knowledge on how to do (computer science) research.
The primary goal of academic developers in constructing probabilistic network-based DSSs is to push the state of the art:
to solve challenging and novel computational problems and problems underlying the construction of probabilistic networks,
464 H.J.M. Tabachneck-Schijf, P.L. Geenen / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 461–471and to publish the results in their scientiﬁc community. These scientists also derive much pride from delivering a high-qual-
ity, highly-accurate system. To avoid having to bear responsibility for incorrect decisions, developers also want to help phy-
sicians to understand the limitations of the tool. For example, the tool’s knowledge base may not be complete.
Tasks within these goals are to select a probabilistic network to construct that offers an interesting computational prob-
lem, to solve that problem, and then develop a robust network with the aid of the knowledge of the domain experts. Devel-
opers then need to construct a way to make data entry by the user possible so that the network can compute an outcome
that will be communicated to the user.
It is clear that, except that both want a model that works with high accuracy, the goals and tasks of the developers and
physicians are nearly totally different. Their knowledge base and mental model, at least where it concerns the DSS, also are
completely different. A mental model, another cognitive science term, is an explanation in someone’s thought processes of
how something works or is put together in the real world. This explanation is built up when needed using the knowledge
base. The developer is expert in the computational part, and the physician in the content part.
A person always interprets that which he perceives through the ﬁlter of his own knowledge base, as if looking through a
pair of glasses. One’s knowledge base ‘colors’ all incoming information, because this information is immediately enriched by,
and interpreted with the help of the existing knowledge. The brain does this automatically: one cannot ‘turn off’ the existing
information in one’s knowledge base, e.g., [1]. When a person recognizes a piece of incoming information, the percept of the
incoming information activates the existing knowledge about this information in the knowledge base. If there is further
knowledge associated with that activated knowledge, it too will be activated, somewhat like circles spreading from a stone
thrown in a pond the further away the circle, the less activation. All this activation happens completely automatically, upon
perception; one can neither direct nor turn-off activation. The result of this ﬁltering of information through one’s knowledge
base is that the developer constructs a system based on his ‘design model’, while the user interprets a system on his ‘user’s
model’ – and almost in any application there exists a large gap between the two [14]. In the next section, we look at the
common probabilistic network representation through the user’s and through the developer’s glasses.
3.2. Switching glasses between developer and user
First we put on the user’s glasses. Physicians, when looking at the common probabilistic network representation, see a
large number of very familiar medical terms, each in a little box connected by arrows to other boxes. They certainly do
not ‘see’ a probabilistic network, because there is nothing in their knowledge base that can recognize, identify or make sense
of a probabilistic network. In each box are also some numbers to be seen. The vast majority of physicians will not be con-
versant with probability theory, and will therefore not be able to interpret this information. Even if they understand prob-
abilistic terms, they will not understand them at the deep level that developers will understand them. For instance,
physicians interpret the edges as diagnostic lines, directionally going from symptoms and test outcomes to disease diagno-
ses. To them, the arrows in the network are pointing in the wrong direction. Moreover, a DSS may need intermediate vari-
ables to correctly model the independence structures, and such intermediate variables may not have any meaning for the
physician, impeding for example checking the model in Phase 2. Physicians do knowwhich data go with which medical term,
and know whether the data they enter are valid or not, and whether those are within a normal range or not. Physicians can-
not see whether computed changes in the network make sense because those are expressed in probabilistic terms. Yes, they
perceive that the numbers are changing, but attaching meaning to that is not supported by their knowledge base. Trying to
carry out medical tasks within such a foreign representation is extremely difﬁcult and time-consuming. Physicians need a
representation that they can recognize, interpret and react to on the basis of their own knowledge base. Because their knowl-
edge base is very different from the developers’, such a representation will necessarily differ completely from the common
probabilistic network representation.
Now we put on the glasses of the developer. Developers see a probabilistic network with nodes and arcs; each node has
probabilities associated with it. Developers’ knowledge base allows them to automatically and quickly recognize and inter-
pret the arcs as interrelations of the variables. Developers probably do not know exactlywhat is really meant with particular
terms supplied by the domain expert. Developers do not know whether entered patient data are valid (e.g., whether a test’s
outcome numbers makes sense), normal or abnormal. Nor do they have any knowledge to interpret the content of the out-
come. For instance, what is the difference between grading and staging a cancer? And even if they understand the outcome,
they will not understand it in the deep way that expert physicians will understand them, immediately realizing all the con-
sequences of the diagnosis in terms of treatment options, life expectancy, etc. One of the real pitfalls is that developers, while
eliciting the experts’ knowledge of the domain, may start to feel that they understand the domain, and may even ﬁll in infor-
mation that the expert has not explicitly communicated. This false feeling of understanding has been coined ‘shallow under-
standing’: people feel they understand something until they are confronted with conﬂicting evidence, either from their own
knowledge or from incoming information [20]. The only part of the model that the developer deeply understands is the com-
putational part. With the help of the common probabilistic representation, the developer can see whether the network prop-
agates changes in probability values, and whether those changes accord with the model, but not whether either the original
values or the computed changes make any medical sense.
Above, we have clariﬁed why different goals, different tasks and different knowledge bases require a different view of the
data. The representations meant for the end user should be designed so that the end user understands them; in cognitive
science terms, so that they align with the mental model of their domain knowledge and task execution. This means that
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means continue to use them if they are the end users, or for dissemination to and communication with other developers.
This also means that other types of users should be provided with representations that suit their knowledge base and mental
models.
We hope that we have also motivated why constructing user-centered representations requires frequent and intensive
contact with the user. Only the actual users can interpret developed representations with their speciﬁc glasses. It is not help-
ful for developers to try to interpret developed representations as if they were the user, because they have different glasses,
and those glasses are not removable. It would take a minimum of 10 years of medical training and practice to acquire med-
ical-expert glasses.
We now switch to the part of the paper where we outline our systematic approach to developing user-centered represen-
tations. The core of the approach lies in systematically applying ﬁve heuristic guidelines that we found particularly useful for
constructing user-centered representations for DSSs. This is to be done in each phase of contact with domain experts or end
users.4. Heuristic guidelines for designing user-centered representations
Although other human–computer guidelines also apply, we feel that the ﬁve presented below proved especially relevant
to the changes that have to be made to align information to a particular knowledge base and mental model. The ﬁrst heu-
ristic was coined by us. The other four are heuristics adapted from established human–computer interaction theory.
4.1. (H1) Preserving precision
The ﬁrst guideline is speciﬁc to designing representations for mathematical models. In probabilistic models, this concerns
the need to preserve the precision of the stochastic variables and values used in the model. The problem is that physicians do
not think in precisely deﬁned stochastic variables but in natural categorical concepts which are inherently hazy. The error in
knowledge transfer occurs here because the developer interprets a variable name as a precisely deﬁned stochastic variable
while physicians interpret it as a categorical concept – hazy, and not as a variable. For instance, say that the variable ‘‘fever”
is deﬁned in a model as a temperature equal to or greater than 101 F. The question to the physician is: Is there a fever pres-
ent, yes or no? However, physicians do not really even agree amongst themselves what they, exactly, consider to be a fever.
The prevalent mental model was that fever is a temperature approximately over 100 F, and that this depends on the patient
who is running the fever and the patient’s current environment. It is a categorical concept, clear enough to be useful within
the medical practice, but not crisp enough for the model. The physician will interpret the question within his mental model,
and enter the data that go with that mental model.
To summarize, it is likely that when non-mathematicians are the end users, different interpretation of a variable exist, one
precise and from a mathematical knowledge base, one categorical and from a non-mathematical knowledge base. With such
different interpretations, there is a good chance that data entered for that variable will not precisely overlap with what the
model needs to know. A translation is needed to either reterm the request for evidence, or to align the entered data with the
model’s precise terms – or both. In our example, one solution would be to ask for the exact temperature, and translate this to
the model’s terms by computing whether that is considered to be a fever within the model. The mental model of ‘temper-
ature’ is the same in both the designer and the physician as it is an objective measurement done with a thermometer. Within
the model, information is then translated to model terms, and precision is preserved. To avoid errors in interpretation and
therefore data entry, preserving precision is of vital importance. Great care must be taken to translate the model’s terms to
terms that, to the physician, mean exactly the same as the stochastic variable means to the developer.
4.2. (H2) User compatibility
The second guideline states that the information presented in the interface in general should align with the user’s mental
model. Speak the user’s language [13], know thy user [11], and workﬂow compatibility [11] are three well-known design heu-
ristics that bear on this guideline. This guideline concerns changes to representations that are speciﬁc to one type of user
only, for instance, physicians or lawyers. These users have their own professional language that is not shared with other pro-
fessional groups or with the population at large.
In our example, these heuristics mean that the developers should use the actual professional language of the physician in
the presented information and not the language coined by the developers; they further mean that the developers should ﬁt
the information ﬂow to the usual professional workﬂow of the physician.
4.3. (H3) Natural language
The third guideline is to follow the principle of simple and natural dialogue [13]. This guideline applies to any type of user.
It means that the information presented to users should, in addition to being user compatible, as much as possible resemble
simple, natural language. The type of language that all users of a particular culture have in common. Where needed, it should
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natural language, again because of the precise deﬁnition of each term in probability theory and the categorical and concep-
tual nature of words in common natural language. Already, large differences exist between natural languages. Think, for in-
stance, of the word ‘table’, and now think of the many types and shapes of tables that you know, which all fall within your
concept of ‘table’. If two people share a culture, no problem. However, a Chinese person will have a different concept of table
than a Dutchman, and even though they will both use the same word if they speak English together, mentally, their models
differ. Much larger differences exist between the same words used in mathematics or in natural language (e.g., ‘number’ and
‘relationship’).
4.4. (H4) Invisible technology
‘Effective interfaces do not concern the user with the inner workings of the system’ [21], or invisible technology [11], con-
stitute the fourth guideline. For mathematical models, this means not showing the computational content of the model, at
least not in a mathematical format. In the case of DSSs, the technology consists of the probabilistic network. The guideline’s
prescription is to hide anything having to do with probability theory, and replace it with something that users normally use
within the execution of their tasks, or at least ﬁts within their mental models, while preserving precision of course.
4.5. (H5) User-efﬁcient system
Lastly, the application should be as efﬁcient as possible, that is, use of the application by the end user should be as efﬁ-
cient as possible. This mainly concerns the speed of interaction with the program, of which efﬁciency in terms of the speed of
the computations is only one part. ‘Look at the user’s productivity, not the computer’s’ [21] and ease of learning and ease of
use [11] are underlying design heuristics. This guideline is important because the users of DSSs are very often demanding
users, which are users whose time is precious (unlike, for instance, college students). The faster and more conveniently they
can interact with the system, the better they will comply with the system’s demands and the more they will use the system.
In the following two sections we will elaborate on Phases 1 and 3 of the interaction with the domain expert or the end
user and explain how these guidelines were applied in our and others’ research. In both phases, examples of tasks will be
given, types of interactions within these tasks will be speciﬁed, and potential sources of knowledge transfer errors will be
identiﬁed. We will present examples of solutions from our or others’ research, but these are merely examples meant to in-
spire and show how the guidelines could be implemented, as there is not just one correct or best solution. Good solutions
will depend on the application and the particular type of user.5. Phase 1: knowledge elicitation
The developer hands the domain expert physician a piece of paper. The paper says: PrðInvasion ¼
T2 j Shape ¼ polypoid; Length < 5 cmÞ. It takes the developer a good 10 min to explain to the physician what exactly
it says on the paper. Finally, the physician provides the needed information. After the 10th explanation of what is on
the paper, the developer is desperate with the slow progress of the physician. At this pace, she will have to interview
the expert for weeks (from own experience, interview with oesophageal cancer specialist, 2004).5.1. Example 1: determine the graphical network structure
Interview domain experts about relevant processes in the domain in order to identify the relevant variables and the val-
ues they may adopt. Error sources: (1) experts dutifully explain the medical processes, but naturally use medical language
that is very difﬁcult to understand by the developer and (2) developers may start to feel that they understand the domain
and ﬁll in unelicited information. The guideline to be applied for the ﬁrst problem is natural language as both the expert and
the developer understand this; also, it helps to develop sensitivity to the communication problem. Usually, the expert slowly
learns to tune explanations to a more natural language; the developer slowly learns to interpret some medical terms. The
expert hardly ever makes progress towards understanding probability theory; in this way the process is asymmetric. To en-
tice the physician to phrase his knowledge in natural language terms, a few hints may be given. For instance, you can ask the
physician to phrase the explanation as if he were explaining things to his (non-physician) mother. You could also give out a
warning that the elicitation process will take much time. Frequently indicating that you, as developer, do not understand
what the expert says also helps. Above all, much patience is asked for. As far as the second issue, the developer should never
make the mistake of ﬁlling in information based on his own acquired medical knowledge. As it takes 10 years to acquire the
deep knowledge of a domain expert, it is not likely that the developer will gain true expertise in a few months, even though
the domain of the DSS is limited. One helpful process to check one’s own assumptions is to provide feedback to the expert in
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have said: ‘‘If more symptoms are present, the stage of the cancer is worse”, which the developer could translate to: ‘‘If more
symptoms are present, it is ALWAYS the case that the stage of the cancer is worse”, explicitly voicing the monotonicity. If the
developer does not recognize the error sources in this phase, the processes modeled in the network will not mirror the real
processes.
5.2. Example 2: take the information elicited from the physician and extract the needed variables and values
Discuss with the physician whether a variable the developer has deﬁned still covers the concept the physician has sup-
plied. Error source: physicians think in often vague categorical concepts, whereas the network needs precisely deﬁned sto-
chastic variables with collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive values. The categories physicians think in almost
inherently overlap and are generally not collectively exhaustive. The guidelines to be applied here are preserving precision,
user compatibility, and natural language. Aligning the two different concepts, one probabilistic and one medical, takes careful
negotiation. In order to create collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive variable values, modeling tricks are needed
whereby variables are redeﬁned and ‘other’ variables/values are created. But redeﬁnition of variables entails a change in
their meaning – something a physician will not relate to, especially if the variable retains the name given it by the physician.
Solutions lie ﬁrst in patience and iteration, and in trying to understand the other’s concepts or making one’s own concepts
understandable by re-representing them, for instance, deﬁning the concept’s boundaries, drawing, or making a table. Rede-
ﬁned variables and added variables/values should get new names, coined by the physician. One can also use the guideline
user compatibility by entering the physicians’ world and observing the symptoms and test results in the way the physician
would. In this way, the developer may be able to come closer to understanding the physician. So, on the one hand, the expert
may be unable to recognize stochastic precision in a variable name or in its values, and the developer cannot compensate for
that. On the other hand, the developer may not be able to see the truly conceptual nature of a physician’s term. Taken to-
gether, the developer and the expert will be talking about two different concepts with all consequences thereof for the mod-
el. An example: in a knowledge elicitation session about cancer, the developer could not understand why the physician could
not give strict boundaries for when a tumor was considered to be in a certain stage. The developer was, frankly, becoming a
bit irritated at the physician’s apparent unwillingness to do so, while the physician was clearly becoming unhappy with her
insistence on crispness. Together viewing X-rays of tumors, it became clear that the physician was truly estimating the stage
of the tumor by using overlapping categories, and that crisp boundaries of the stages simply did not exist. Establishing this
basic understanding took away the mutual irritation, and enabled a fruitful elicitation session (van der Gaag, personal
correspondence).
5.3. Example 3: assess the interdependences of the variables
During interviews, experts are asked about interdependences. Error source: interdependences do not ﬁt within physi-
cians’ mental model of their task execution [2] and they do not know about interdependences in an abstract, mathematical
format. For example, physicians have called two variables ‘independent’ if var1 = true implies var2 = false! In their mental
model, that meant that these two variables had no relation. van der Gaag and Helsper substituted asking about interdepen-
dences (the technology) with the notion of causality, which is compatible with physician’s reasoning. This results in ques-
tions like ‘‘what could cause this symptom?” and ‘‘what manifestations could this disease have?” This follows our guidelines
invisible technology and user compatibility. To check the interdependences, the developer will sometimes present the expert
with a small piece of the network. Error source: experts cannot understand the network structure. To start off with, physi-
cians do not relate to cause–effect relations because they tend not to think in terms of a disease causing symptoms, but
rather in terms of symptoms allowing a diagnosis of disease and a treatment plan. That is, their mental model ﬁts in with
a reasoning pattern that goes in the opposite direction of the arrows in the network. Many of the other reasons that physi-
cians do not understand a network and the other associated symbols such as probability bar diagrams are rooted in these
constructs’ mathematical basis. As a result, as van der Gaag et al. [2] remarked: ‘‘Unfortunately, however, the experts often
appeared to misinterpret the structure.” In their solution they applied the guidelines user compatibility and invisible technol-
ogy. Physicians are very familiar with case descriptions. These researchers therefore replaced network structures (reﬂecting
the technology) with case descriptions (reasoning compatible with physicians’ mental model), e.g.: ‘‘Suppose that you have a
patient with a high fever, and you have made an assessment of the patient’s muscle aches. Can knowledge of the presence or
absence of a headache change your assessment?” Schreiber et al. [18] and Scott et al. [19] have suggested a similar approach.
5.4. Example 4: assess the probabilities
Users are provided with probabilities to be assessed in probabilistic notation, for instance PrðInvasion ¼ T2 j Shape ¼
polypoid; Length < 5 cmÞ. Error source: this format is not understood by the user. Moreover, van der Gaag et al. [4] reports
about their experiences: ‘‘Especially the meaning of what is represented on either side of the conditioning bar appeared to be
confusing, and in fact remained to be so during successive interviews”. Other methods used here are probability-scale meth-
ods, gamble-like methods, and probability-wheel methods. However, those representations also were shown to be badly
understood by the user. Van der Gaag et al. [4] tested the ﬁrst two of these methods. Regarding the probability scale, users
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by the ‘spacing effect’: they placed their marks unconsciously so that they looked attractively spaced. The gambling method
was also ineffective and very demanding. Users found that the speciﬁc lotteries were very hard to conceive of because of the
rare or unethical situations they presented, which went against their mental model of medical practice. The gambling meth-
od does a little better job at invisible technology, but it also is not compatible with the users’ mental model of their usual tasks
and experiences. The authors remark: ‘‘... the gambling appeared to be rather demanding on the experts. Apparently, it devi-
ated substantially from their usual cognitive processes.” In addition, both methods were found to be time-consuming, which
runs counter to our user-efﬁcient system guideline. A brief overview of the probability-wheel method was provided by Ren-
ooij [17]. She stated that this method also tends to be time-consuming, and is not suitable for assessing very large or very
small probabilities as the users cannot perceive the difference. The solution proposed by van der Gaag et al. [3,4] is to design
a new method, based on transcribing probabilities in case-like terms (guidelines: user compatibility and hiding technology),
accompanied by a scale in common, well-understood reasoning terms as certain, probable and ﬁfty-ﬁfty and their associated
approximate percentages (guideline natural language). These two representations together proved to be well-understood and
efﬁcient as well, enabling the researchers to elicitate 150–175 probability estimates per hour. Still, physicians feel uncom-
fortable with any use of probabilities in numerical form [22].6. Phase 3: data entry
Surreptitious laughter sounds from the room. The users have just spotted the probabilistic network underlying their
DSS. Their expressions show disbelief and lack of understanding, even though we have just explained what a probabi-
listic network is and does and all have indicated their understanding of our explanation (from one of the veterinarian
user sessions, 2006).
In Phase 3, the developer mainly interacts with the end user. Examples exist of data-entry modules that have been de-
signed on user-centered principles, e.g. [10,7] but clear heuristic guidelines have not been identiﬁed. The information used
in the interface of the data-entry module needs to preserve the precision of the stochastic variables in the model, but yet be
termed in user language. The entered answers, on the other hand, are in the user’s language, and may need to be translated
back into the precisely deﬁned information needed by the model. In keeping with our third guideline we wanted the infor-
mation presented to our end users to be as close as possible to natural language. The guideline of invisible technology de-
manded that network representations remain hidden to the non-mathematical user. User-efﬁcient system drove us to
optimize the speed at which data could be entered. These design guidelines could in essence be applied without involving
the end users. However, for aligning our terms with the user’s language and matching the workﬂow of the system to the
practitioners’ workﬂow, as well as for preserving precision, interaction with our end users was of the essence.6.1. Example 1: a data-entry module is needed for a user to provide evidence
The developer supplies the user with data entry based on the network representation. Error sources: (1) the user does not
understand the network representation and (2) the variable names used will not be understood by the user as precisely de-
ﬁned stochastic variables but, at best, as concepts. For the ﬁrst problem, apply invisible technology and natural language
guidelines. We designed a user interface for the data-entry module of a veterinary application, using the guidelines we out-
lined above (a paper describing the design in more detail is in preparation). The interface was re-represented from a Bayesian
network representation to a questionnaire. According to Gliner and Morgan [5], questionnaires are particularly useful for
quantitative research, especially in comparative and descriptive approaches. Moreover, with a questionnaire one can specify
a choice of possible answers corresponding to the values in the network. Also, most people are familiar with them. In the
questionnaire, it is advisable to use close-ended questions as much as possible, as open questions can introduce more trans-
lation errors, e.g. the developer is faced with difﬁcult to interpret user language or the answer is not among the values the
network can interpret. In addition, open answers require keystroke entries, much slower than clicking, which violates our
user-efﬁcient system guideline. The questionnaire was implemented in our application as keywords with associated pull-
down variable value boxes. Hernando et al. [7] also used the guidelines hiding technology and user compatibility. Diabetic
users needed to enter data at each mealtime on blood values and meal contents. Their solution was similar to ours, a
data-entry module consisting of pull-down boxes to choose values. The boxes were arranged horizontally on a time axis,
which agreed with the users’ mental model of time ﬂow in a day.
For the second problem, misunderstanding stochastic values as concepts, we applied the user compatibility and preserve
precision guidelines to align the mathematical constructs with the mental model of the user. Our solution was to ask the
users to deﬁne their own terms which, in their professional language, covered the precise deﬁnition of the stochastic vari-
ables. The users were given the model’s precise deﬁnitions in (partly) user-compatible words (obtained from domain ex-
perts), and were asked to term these in their own language and to deﬁne a keyword that covered the deﬁnition.
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The developer constructs a program on a computer or hands the user a form to be ﬁlled out. Error source: neither means
of entry may be suitable to the users’ work environment or work ﬂow. Solutions: Apply the user compatibility guideline. Ask
users about the circumstances under which they need to carry out the data entry; discuss ways to circumvent problems. We
did so in a case where the users needed to collect evidence in a dusty, possibly contaminated pig stable, and together decided
to put the data-entry module on a personal digital assistant (PDA). This can easily be carried into a pig stable and be covered
by sturdy, well-closed plastic bags which can be discarded so that contamination is prevented.
6.3. Example 3: the data-entry questions need to be ordered
The user is confronted with an ordering that is constructed by the developer from the model’s viewpoint. Error source:
this ordering may not ﬁt the user’s workﬂow or mental model of the task. This will slow down users, even if they can reply to
questions in a random order, because they will have to search for the question to answer that next ﬁts into their workﬂow.
Again, the user compatibility guideline can be applied by consulting the user. For instance, we needed to order a set of 26
questions along the users’ work ﬂow, which also had to be divided into groups of up to ﬁve questions to ﬁt the PDA’s inter-
face. The users were given cards with the questions printed on them. They were asked to group cards together in for them
natural groups, then to sort the groups in an order that ﬁt in with their normal workﬂow. Next, we asked the users to order
the questions within each group, and then to write down their grouping rationale so we would know the underlying cate-
gorization principle(s). Two types of orderings ensued; by examining the frequency by which two questions were grouped
together, we arrived at clusters which best ﬁt the orderings and also ﬁt our limited interface space. Grouping was also carried
out in [8], in the development of a questionnaire. The questions of the actual questionnaire part are grouped, but it is not
clear what the researchers used as a basis for ordering.
To further improve the efﬁciency of the system, we also attempted to minimize keystroke input as well as the number of
clicks the users had to carry out. Keystrokes were limited to entries that could be carried out either before or after the in situ
visit to the pig stable, where handling the PDA was easier because it did not need its protective covering. This ordering also
accorded with the information gathering ﬂow of the veterinarians.7. Evaluation of the data-entry system developed under these guidelines
In the sections above we used examples that came from a veterinary application of which the interface was designed
according to our guidelines. We evaluated its usability in an extensive survey with eight of the ten veterinarians who had
tried the system in a ﬁeld trial. Here, we present a brief summary. In general, the system’s usability was highly rated. Having
the actual users order the questions in groups and then order the groups of questions paid off. Most (5 of 8) vets thought that
the ordering of the questions followed their workﬂow very well; all felt they could ﬁt the order on the interface into their
workﬂow with little problem. In addition, very few problems were reported as to omissions of relevant or inclusions of irrel-
evant variables or values.
We were also pleased with the results from ensuring user-compatible keywords and answers. Aside from three rather
complex variables, the precise (model) meaning of the variables and their values was well preserved to exactly preserved.
Clear is that it is not advisable to subsume a complex question, where a variable can take on different values depending
on to be determined circumstances, under a keyword. User compatibility was well-served as the veterinarians reported no
problems with understanding items, be they questions, answers or buttons/icons we had deﬁned. Interestingly, they did
have problems interpreting the PDA-imposed buttons/icons, etc.
It did take extra time per visit to enter the data (with some practice, a diagnosis took 9 min per pig with vs. 3 min per pig
without the PDA), but a more thorough diagnosis was performed. This sometimes resulted in secondary diagnoses vets
acknowledged they would probably have missed without the PDA, as they normally just focus on one diagnosis per group
of animals. In fact, the only serious problems reported with the PDA were technical: the information could not always be sent
right away, and the PDA would sometimes shut down without warning. Both events resulted in loss of data. Moreover, read-
ability suffered somewhat because the PDA had to be covered to provide protection and guarantee cleanliness.8. Conclusions
In this paper, we have begun to identify a systematic approach to improve those representations used in design and use of
a probabilistic DSS that are meant for the domain expert and for the end user. To this purpose, we have presented ﬁve heu-
ristic guidelines we identiﬁed as being particularly effective in guiding our own representation designs. Most of these guide-
lines are meant to (1) increase awareness of the differences between the developer and the non-mathematical user or
domain expert; (2) show the necessity of aligning representations intended for the user to the users’ mental model; and
(3) support the need to translate user information into model information and vice versa, before and after user-developer
interactions have taken place. One guideline underscores the need to make the application efﬁcient for the end user,
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interaction information and see whether any of it violates one of our heuristic guidelines. If so, the representation needs
to be altered, in the vast majority of cases while consulting with a domain expert or an end user. We feel that following this
advice can prevent many knowledge-transfer errors.
These guidelines can be applied during the development process of a DSS, from knowledge elicitation to justifying the
outcomes of the probabilistic model. Four of the guidelines originate from commonly known human-computer interaction
theory. One guideline, preserving precision, was coined by us and is speciﬁc to mathematical modeling. It concerns the prob-
lematic difference between rather hazy user concepts and precisely deﬁned stochastic variables, and targets the translation
from user model to design model and vice versa.
To help us to systematically identify the different moments where better interactions with the user may result in consid-
erable improvements to the model’s contents and use, we divided the development process into ﬁve phases. In each phase
several interactions are distinguished. The application itself and the type(s) of users determine which interactions are
needed; these may differ from the ones we speciﬁed. The interactions mentioned in this paper reﬂect the experiences of
our research group in developing (bio)medical DSSs.
We illustrated the use of our systematic approach of applying the guidelines in each phase by explaining the cause of the
knowledge transfer errors and giving examples of user-centered solutions. In essence, knowledge transfer errors are caused
by the large differences between what is in the head of the mathematical developer and of the non-mathematical user. Train-
ing and commonly executed tasks do not overlap and result in knowledge bases that are in general completely different. As
incoming information immediately mixes with and is interpreted by the existing knowledge base this is as if different types
of professions are wearing different glasses. When looking at the same information they ‘see’ something different. For in-
stance, what either ‘sees’ in a medical record and a classical probabilistic network representation is very different.
Brieﬂy we describe the mostly positive evaluation of a DSS data-entry module that was designed along the guidelines
identiﬁed in this paper. The interface was very well received. It is telling that we never received even one call for help on
the data-entry.
We hope that this paper will initiate a fruitful discussion about the positive results of involving the user in a meaningful
interaction with the developer throughout the development process. Applying the heuristic guidelines may well lead to a
further dissemination of probabilistic decision support systems. With our growing awareness of the issues in knowledge
transfer, and our successes thus far, we will certainly continue to ﬁrm up and apply our systematic approach, also for inter-
actions that occur within Phases 2, 4 and 5.
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